The SASC (Senate Armed Services Committee) on May 14, 2015 approved a bill that blocked the USAF plans to mothball the A-10. Until now, the exact A-10 language in the bill, that authorizes nearly $590 billion in spending, was not public.
Senator Kelly Ayotte, a staunch advocate for the A-10’s Close Air Support mission released a statement on the language today: “When our ground troops and special operators are pinned down by enemy fire and calling for help, our nation has a responsibility to send the very best close air support possible – and the defense bill reflects that commitment by preventing the premature retirement of the A-10 for the next year. Retiring the A-10 before an equally capable replacement is fully operational would result in additional and unnecessary American casualties in future conflicts. The Air Force should listen to our ground troops and end its efforts to send our nation’s best close air support aircraft to the boneyard. If the Air Force persists, I will continue to do all I can to oppose that effort and to ensure our ground troops have the close air support they need to accomplish their missions and return home safely to their families.”
Mandy Smithberger, Director of the Straus Military Reform Project stated, “We’re glad to see there is bicameral support so far for protecting our ground forces by keeping the A-10 in the Air Force’s inventory, and that the leadership of the House and Senate Armed Services committees have seen through the Air Force’s short-sighted and irresponsible proposal.
Lt. Colonel (ret) Tony Carr, publisher of the popular military website John Q. Public said: “This demonstrates that the politics around the A-10 have shifted fundamentally. It’s an issue where both chambers heard a range of opinions and decided to trust those arguing what’s best for national defense. What remains to be seen is whether the Air Force will continue trying to defy Congressional intent or get the clear message that the country is committed to world-class Close Air Support now and in the future.”
The provisions of the bill show strong protections for the A-10:
SEC. 134. PROHIBITION ON RETIREMENT OF A-10 AIRCRAFT.
(a) Prohibition on Availability of Funds for Retirement- None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2016 for the Air Force may be obligated or expended to retire, prepare to retire, or place in storage or on backup aircraft inventory status any A-10 aircraft.
(b) Additional Limitations on Retirement-
(1) IN GENERAL- In addition to the limitation in subsection (a), during the period before December 31, 2016, the Secretary of the Air Force may not retire, prepare to retire, or place in storage or on backup flying status any A-10 aircraft.
(2) MINIMUM INVENTORY REQUIREMENT- The Secretary of the Air Force shall ensure the Air Force maintains a minimum of 171 A-10 aircraft designated as primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI).
(c) Prohibition on Availability of Funds for Significant Reductions in Manning Levels- None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2016 for the Air Force may be obligated or expended to make significant reductions to manning levels with respect to any A-10 aircraft squadrons or divisions.
(d) Additional Limitation on Significant Reductions in Manning Levels- -In addition to the limitation in subsection (c), during the period before December 31, 2016, the Secretary of the Air Force may not make significant reductions to manning levels with respect to any A-10 aircraft squadrons or divisions.
(e) Study on Replacement Capability Requirements or Mission Platform for the A-10 Aircraft-
(1) INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT REQUIRED-
(A) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of the Air Force shall commission an appropriate entity outside the Department of Defense to conduct an assessment of the required capabilities or mission platform to replace the A-10 aircraft. This assessment would represent preparatory work to inform an analysis of alternatives.
(B) ELEMENTS- The assessment required under subparagraph (A) shall include each of the following:
(i) Future needs analysis for the current A-10 aircraft mission set to include troops-in-contact/close air support, air interdiction, strike control and reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue support in both contested and uncontested battle environments. At a minimum, the needs analysis should specifically address the following areas:
(I) The ability to safely and effectively conduct troops-in-contact/danger close missions or missions in close proximity to civilians in the presence of the air defenses found with enemy ground maneuver units.
(II) The ability to effectively target and destroy moving, camouflaged, or dug-in troops, artillery, armor, and armored personnel carriers.
(III) The ability to remain within visual range of friendly forces and targets to facilitate responsiveness to ground forces and minimize re-attack times.
(IV) The ability to safely conduct close air support beneath low cloud ceilings and in reduced visibilities at low airspeeds in the presence of the air defenses found with enemy ground maneuver units.
(V) The capability to enable the pilot and aircraft to survive attacks stemming from small arms, machine guns, MANPADs, and lower caliber anti-aircraft artillery organic or attached to enemy ground forces and maneuver units.
(VI) The ability to communicate effectively with ground forces and downed pilots, including in communications jamming or satellite-denied environments.
(VII) The ability to execute the missions described in subclauses (I), (II), (III), and (IV) in a GPS- or satellite-denied environment with or without sensors.
(VIII) The ability to deliver multiple lethal firing passes and sustain long loiter endurance to support friendly forces throughout extended ground engagements.
(IX) The ability to operate from unprepared dirt, grass, and narrow road runways and to generate high sortie rates under these austere conditions.
(ii) Identification and assessment of gaps in the ability of existing and programmed mission platforms in providing required capabilities to conduct missions specified in clause (i) in both contested and uncontested battle environments.
(iii) Assessment of operational effectiveness of existing and programmed mission platforms to conduct missions specified in clause (i) in both contested and uncontested battle environments.
(iv) Assessment of probability of likelihood of conducting missions requiring troops-in-contact/close air support operations specified in clause (i) in contested environments as compared to uncontested environments.
(v) Any other matters the independent entity or the Secretary of the Air Force determines to be appropriate.
(2) REPORT-
(A) IN GENERAL- Not later than September 30, 2016, the Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes the assessment required under paragraph (1).
(B) FORM- The report required under subparagraph (A) may be submitted in classified form, but shall also contain an unclassified executive summary and may contain an unclassified annex.
(3) NONDUPLICATION OF EFFORT- If any information required under paragraph (1) has been included in another report or notification previously submitted to Congress by law, the Secretary of the Air Force may provide a list of such reports and notifications at the time of submitting the report required under paragraph (2) in lieu of including such information in the report required under paragraph (2).