From my perspective as a retired Army attack helicopter aviator, we owe it to the ground soldiers, those on the front lines, to keep the A-10 Warthog close air support (CAS) airplane in service until a replacement of equal or better capability can be fielded.
I say this from my 35 years of Army attack helicopter (AH-1 Cobra and AH-64 Apache) aviator experience where I started learning, in the early 1980s, that the A-10 was an exceptional CAS aircraft, especially when used in conjunction with attack helicopters. The synergy of the A-10 and the AH-1 / AH-64 in combat missions is phenomenal. I learned these lessons from participating in dozens of JAAT (Joint Air Attack Team) live-fire exercises, training (JAAT, Rescort [Rescue/Escort] / Sandy CSAR / PR missions and Air-to-Air (A-10 versus AH-64) with the Air Force Fighter Weapons School A-10 / JTAC squadron, and live-fire combat JAAT (with the A-10) missions in Afghanistan. One of these JAAT (A-10 & AH-64) missions in Afghanistan was during the rescue of the 4 female aid workers (1 British, 1 Kenyan, and 2 Afghan) by Delta Force / SAS in 2012 where I was the AH-64 team air mission commander.
I have also participated in over 100 peacetime / combat missions using Air Force TACPs (Tactical Air Control Party Specialists). TACPs are truly outstanding in coordinating aerial firepower, and they have saved numerous soldiers’ lives in combat. The Air Force wants to get rid of all the A-10s and reduce the TACP force by 50% and, in my opinion, this does not pass the common-sense test.
If you’ve seen the movie “Devotion” that came out in 2022, you can understand the concept: the soldiers in the thick of battle in the Korean War, who watched the F4U-4 Corsairs fly low, directly overhead. Their morale is bolstered, as they realize the might of the U.S. military is behind them. In fact, some of the pilots flew so low that the soldiers on the ground could see the pilots’ faces. And that’s what CAS brings to the fight – pilots who are literally over the shoulder of the ground soldier, who can see from their perspective what it will take to help them win the battle. See the CAS video links at the end of this article.
That is what the A-10 brings to the fight for the ground soldier. Not a high altitude, soda straw view, but dedicated CAS airplanes and pilots in the thick of it so that these airborne grunt pilots can use all of their senses and even their peripheral vision to take it all in and do “pass after pass” until the job is done. The Broken Arrow video scene from “We Were Soldiers Once” has a great CAS sequence to further drive home this point and illustrates the importance of the A-10 and why it is just as relevant now as ever.
After watching the Broken Arrow video scene, imagine sending F-35 pilots who are poorly trained in CAS to support these troops, while trying to figure out the ground situation when flying at a very high altitude, looking through a very narrow radar picture when above the clouds. Additionally, the importance of well-trained TACPs is evidenced in this video clip that shows that fratricide can happen when poorly trained pilots are tasked to support a dynamic / defensive fight.
Close Air Support is – as the name implies – air support to friendly forces, in close proximity to the ground soldier who is doing combat with the enemy. Without it, friendly forces are largely on their own. CAS is what gives the U.S. military an advantage in combat and serves as a testament to the dedication we give our Soldiers, Marines and Sailors. The U.S. has your back.
While the Army has not always recognized the term “CAS” for its own helicopters – often referring to the term as CCA (Close Combat Attack) or similar monikers* – it essentially provides the same “over the shoulder” airpower to ground soldiers . . . just at a much slower speed enroute to the target area than the Air Force’s A-10 Warthog. thus, the A-10 can get to the target area much quicker.
The AH-64 Apache is a mainstay for the Army and is expected to remain its heavy attack asset for the next 20+ years. It is, without a doubt, the premier attack helicopter, but as a helicopter, its speed and firepower will never compete with much faster aircraft like the A-10. What the Apache brings to the fight is its ability to hover and literally hide in the terrain, flying so low that it is mostly undetectable by enemy radar. Employed as a team, the Apache and the A-10 become even more lethal due to complementary capabilities. Soldiers in a tough fight will need CAS, CCA, and on occasion, a joint effort from Apaches and A-10s.
The Army has a looming capability gap. Once FVL (Future Vertical Lift) comes online, the Army will not have escort aircraft fast enough to support it. In short, FVL is the Army’s transition into the future, with plans to replace much of its aging fleet with much faster and more advanced aircraft. While new aircraft like the Bell V-280 Valor – the future replacement for the UH-60 Blackhawk – can fly at 300 knots, the Apache is significantly slower and won’t be able to keep up. Even if the Apache is modified with a pusher-prop – imagine an aft-facing fan at the back of the helicopter instead of a tail rotor – its top speed would likely be limited to around 230 knots. The A-10 is a 350 knot CAS aircraft flown by pilots who regularly train with the Army, meaning it’s an ideal platform to support the Army’s fleet of FVL.
An Apache modified with a pusher-prop may yield an aircraft that can potentially fill the gap, but until that time, the Army needs what the A-10 provides: speed, payload, survivability, low level / below the clouds CAS, not to mention the wealth of knowledge A-10 pilots bring to the joint fight. Ultimately, this isn’t just a capability gap for the Army, but a Joint Force capability gap. The DoD still needs the A-10, and we owe it to the soldiers on the front lines to make sure that they are covered.
The F-22 and F-35, while very capable in their own unique ways, are not CAS-based platforms and have no business putting rounds down near our ground soldiers nor flying at very low altitudes; case in point, the F-35A (Air Force variant) does not even train for CAS. They weren’t designed for it. Its engine is surrounded and cooled by fuel, meaning that the aircraft is highly vulnerable to AAA/SAMs. That’s why it’s prohibited from flying near thunderstorms. Its inaccurate gun was designed for self-defense, so it only carries 180 rounds (that’s 3 passes) and has a reputation for missing targets. They aren’t equipped for and do not train to support the Army in a close / maneuvering fight. Meanwhile, the A-10 was built to survive in a low and close fight. The pilot sits in a tub of titanium armor that was designed to withstand direct hits from 23 mm exploding shells. The A-10 can also fly much slower over the target area than an F-35. The A-10 can also operate out of a shorter dirt runway much closer to the battle area, which allows the A-10 to not require air-to-air refueling tanker airplanes, whereas the F-35 requires long, hard-surfaced runways that are usually much further from the battle area, thus requiring air-to-air refueling. The Air Force has a huge problem in that it does not have enough refueling tanker airplanes, and these tanker aircraft are easy targets.
Some would argue that in a contested fight – sometimes referred to as LSCO (Large Scale Combat Operations) – an aircraft like the A-10 can’t help the Air Force gain air superiority. While that point can be debated (but not against enemy helicopters), what cannot be debated is that in combat there will always be ground soldiers in need of close air support. That will probably never change. And the A-10 was designed specifically to do just that. That, and kill tanks. Lots of tanks. So while the F-22 and F-35 can strive for air superiority, the A-10 can do what it does best: CAS and tank killing.
And don’t forget that the A-10 was a part of the solution for the Fulda Gap scenario that allowed the military and civilian policy planners – who lived in the shadow of the Cold War – to think widely about what large-scale conflict might mean and how the U.S. could be effective in such a conflict. Ask yourself: are things that different today than they were then? Not really.
Bottom line: currently there is NO equivalent platform – across the DoD – that can provide the speed, firepower, and precision support in low-level close proximity to friendly forces like the A-10 Warthog. Period. Until that time, our policymakers need to extend the life of the A-10 so it can hold on to the unique gap that it provides until a replacement of equal or better capability can be fielded. The A-10 is a proven aircraft with a proven mission and giving it the axe is a disservice to the U.S. military at large – but, in particular, a disservice to our Soldiers, Marines and Sailors on the front line.
What can you do to help? Engage your local Congress representative, Senator, and tell them that the Air Force needs to pause its divestment plan of the A-10 and keep all of its TACPs Terminal Air Control; Party Specialists) until the GAO (Government Accountability Office) can do a full non-biased study of this effect to the joint fight. Ground soldiers are at great risk if the A-10 goes away. There is simply nothing comparable to replace it and probably won’t be anytime soon. Be sure to check out Troops-in-Contact.org to learn more and why this is such an important issue for our military. This website also has a sample letter to send to your Congress representative or Senator.
Visit troops-in-contact.org for more detailed information on CAS capabilities.
“We Were Soldiers Once” scene ref calling in CAS
“We Were Soldiers Once” scene ref Broken Arrow
“Seal Team Air Support – A10 Inbound”
Combat video # 1 of A-10s doing CAS in Afghanistan
Combat video # 2 of A-10s doing CAS in Afghanistan
“Grunts (A-10 pilots) in the Sky”
https://youtu.be/HpCvySLGuOA
“What Exactly is Close Air Support?”
https://sofrep.com/fightersweep/what-close-air-support-is-and-isnt-part-one/
A-10 Warthog Tankbuster – The Most Feared Aircraft in the Air Force Arsenal
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AoUp9HWBQJc
Rand Study on the A-10 Warthog
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1233.html
Boeing AH-64 Apache video
https://youtu.be/LFkDTX6T2CE
* FM 3-04 (Army Aviation) currently describes this concept as in close contact with friendly ground maneuver forces, sometimes referred to as ICC (In Close Contact).