USAF Must Return to the Principles of War

By Brian Boeding

The United States Air Force (USAF) is attempting to completely overhaul the force structure with near-zero regard for the principles of war. FY22 budget requests and the National Defense Strategy (NDS), show senior leaders’ desire to retire aging fleets in favor of next-generation platforms and technology. Since the release of the 2018 NDS,¹ and continued with the 2022 NDS,²  a common trend has emerged. The Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Frank Kendall, and headquarters staffs, following Mr. Kendall’s lead, assess specific weapon systems by asking a simple question; “does it scare China?”³ This question focuses USAF efforts on a single adversary and simplifies decision-making as the United States returns to great power competition and prepares for potential large-scale combat operations. However, there is a fatal flaw in myopically applying the “scare China” question when considering the future of individual platforms. A platform-centric mindset perpetuates stove-piped decision-making and ignores the principles of war.

The Secretary of the Air Force and USAF senior leaders must return to the principles of war to assess what is needed to deter or defeat Chinese aggression. Modern applications of the principles of war are far more informative than asking if a specific airplane, boat, or vehicle “scares China.” Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, lists the principles of operations as objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Many of the principles of operations link together, while others aim towards commander decision-making in planning and executing operations. This article will focus on mass, maneuver, unity of command and surprise. These principles should form the foundation of any discussion regarding future force structure. The USAF must make divestment, acquisition, and modernization decisions while focusing these principles against the priorities in the NDS.

MASS

“The superiority in numbers is the most important factor in the result of a combat, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating circumstances. The direct result of this is, that the greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point.” Clausewitz, On War⁴

The USAF is starting to neglect mass. As Clausewitz identifies, a military strategist cannot deny the advantage granted by possessing a larger force than the adversary. A large number of weapons will be required to defeat an adversary in a conflict. This fact remains true in nuclear deterrence.⁶ USAF planning deliberately starts at the target and the first step is always the same: asking what types – and quantities – of weapons achieve the desired effects against the target? Regardless of the delivery platform, weapons destroy or affect a target. This article focuses on kinetic weapons. It is important to note, however, the principles of war apply across all domains and the electromagnetic spectrum.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates what happens with limited stockpiles of precision-guided munitions and the inability to accurately employ unguided weapons. This lack of massed weapons rapidly led to a modern military employing exquisite weapons and platforms against targets with minimal strategic weight⁷. The USAF’s ability to employ mass against an enemy is governed by the following: the number of aircraft, the number of weapons carried by the aircraft, the reliability of the aircraft, the number of weapons available to load on aircraft, the reliability of the weapons, and the ability to recover the aircraft, refuel, reload, and launch the aircraft again (referred to as “turning an aircraft”). Simply put, the USAF needs more aircraft, with more weapons, executing more “turns,” to increase mass against an adversary. The B-1 bomber may load up to 24 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM).⁸ The B-1 typically launches from airfields far from the areas of operations and can require long transit times back to base, followed by long turn times to reload and refuel. The F-16 and F-15E also carry JASSM, however, the F-16 can only carry two JASSM, while the F-15E may carry up to five JASSM⁵ (modifications to carry more than 2 are necessary). If acquired and outfitted with conformal fuel tanks, the F-15EX may also carry a significant number of weapons. These fighters operate from airfields closer to the battlespace and have shorter turn times than bombers. As a result, a four-ship of F-15E Strike Eagles could bring more mass than multiple B-1 bombers in a 24-hour period.

How can the USAF increase mass at low cost? One simple way is integrating as many stand-off weapons onto 4^th generation fighter and attack aircraft as possible. Why doesn’t the F-15E carry Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles (ARGM)?⁹ Why doesn’t the A-10C carry JASSM?¹⁰ Why does the F-16  no longer carry Harpoons?¹¹ Increasing standoff weapon capabilities on older platforms enables significantly more flexibility in massing fires against a decisive point. 4^th generation platforms also provide lower operating costs and can carry more weapons than their 5^th generation counterparts.

The main counterargument to this idea is that 4^th generation fighters will struggle to get to a weapons employment zone, even for our longest-range standoff weapons, in a fight against China. Although this counterargument holds up when considering a single 4^th generation fighter attempting to get to a launch envelope alone… it does not hold up when considering the added survivability of joint operations. The 4^th generation fighter carrying stand-off weapons falls well below the noise floor of large-scale combat operations. With F-22s and F-35s engaging J-16s and J-20s, and US submarines are sinking Chinese air defense ships, the Viper with a few JASSM likely falls very low on a Chinese Prioritized Target List (ChPTL, pronounced ‘chip-tull’).

Just as every Ukrainian seems to be holding a Javelin or a Stinger right now to mass firepower, we need every USAF fighter aircraft capable of employing stand-off weapons. The ability to employ mass via large quantities of weapons, dispersed across many platforms, scares everyone, not just China. The ability to repeat the cycle many times per day offers the advantage of mass to a Combatant Commander (CCDR) while minimizing the reduction in fighting strength from losing a single aircraft. There is risk in ordering any aircraft to operate west of Hawaii in a hypothetical fight against China. However, dispersing standoff weapons across more platforms reduces risk to the mission. Increasing the number of platforms involved in delivering standoff weapons reduces the risk to each individual platform. Moreover, the dispersal of weapons across platforms improves the ability to maneuver.

MANEUVER

“Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, [make] your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War¹²

U.S. Army Major Gary Creek, in his School of Advanced Military Studies paper, Battlefield Dispersion: The Hidden Dimension in the Principle of Mass,¹⁴ asserts “battlefield dispersion has rendered the force-oriented decisive point much less decisive than in the time of Jomini, and that through dispersion, it is possible to ‘deny the decisive point’ to the enemy and thereby dissipate his combat power.”

Although the USAF is looking at operational dispersion of its forces to various airfields¹⁶ in the land domain, the extension of this principle applies in the air domain. A strike package becomes vulnerable if highly visible bombers are carrying most of the weapons allocated to high-priority targets. Any leak of information, or detectable signatures of the large force required to protect such a high-value asset, offers an enemy the opportunity to mass against the bombers’ route of travel. The dispersion of high-priority weapons across the B-1, B-52, F-15E, F-16, A-10, and other platforms, masks the center of gravity of the strike package. The impact of any single adversary action is reduced, and the resiliency of our own targeting system is bolstered. Implementing standoff weapons on as many 4^th generation platforms as possible takes advantage of the advances in western weapon technologies while improving dispersion. Current plans to divest many 4^th generation fighter aircraft to acquire and sustain 5^th generation aircraft with lower weapons carriage capacities is counter to the principles of mass and maneuver. This is further reinforced by the unforeseen sustainment costs associated with 5^th generation platforms, as noted by the Government Accountability Office,¹⁷ which seems likely to lead to a smaller 5^th generation fleet than envisioned. “For example, the Air Force needs to reduce estimated annual per-plane costs by $3.7 million (47%) by 2036, or costs in that year alone will be $4.4 billion more than it can afford.” Leaders must consider factors such as weapons carriage capacity, austere field capability, speed, turn times, and mission capable rates to prioritize divestments and acquisitions. Additionally, effects of wartime attrition must be considered. As seen with the ongoing war in Ukraine, large conflicts typically extend beyond anticipated timelines. In a long war, the ability to take losses, regenerate the force and continue fighting is paramount.³⁷ Regenerating 5th generation fighters and other exquisite platforms is costly, time-consuming, and difficult to execute at scale.

While Major Creek describes dispersion as a dimension within the principle of mass, he does so from the perspective of being unable to mass against a well-dispersed adversary. However, the USAF views dispersion as a form of operational maneuver and is at the forefront of the Agile Combat Employment effort. In December of 2021, the USAF released Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21, Agile Combat Employment.¹⁵ Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is “a proactive and reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability while generating combat power throughout the integrated deterrence continuum.” The issue with the current definition of ACE is executing “within threat timelines.” Threat timelines will continue to shorten. The amount of time required to load a specific weapon or refuel a specific platform is a fixed number. Once planners accept that threat timelines will outpace some of our abilities to reload and refuel, possessing a force that can sustain losses becomes paramount. Understanding risk is critical in deciding how many, and what type, of platforms and weapons need to exist in our arsenal.

As a final note on maneuver, the dispersal of stand-off weapons enables flanking adversaries in the air domain. One can easily imagine the ease in preparing to defend against a single axis of attack versus preparing to defend from an attack originating from three areas of the battlespace. On the defender’s side, a multiple-axis attack requires the defender to have extremely disciplined command and control practices. In the fog and friction of war, as seen with Russian command and control, it is easy to lose track of one’s own forces, adversary locations, and how to best defend one’s own centers of gravity. The Ukrainians are effectively utilizing the principles of mass and maneuver by dispersing large quantities of anti-tank and air defense weapons throughout the battlespace and synchronizing multiple, simultaneous attacks on isolated groups of vehicles.¹⁹

Air forces may achieve the same effect by dispersing standoff weapons across many platforms and several formations. A multiple-axis attack one day may be followed up with feints and flanks the next. However, successfully completing operational and tactical maneuvers at scale requires large numbers of aircraft that can turn rapidly and employ as many weapons per sortie as possible. Dispersing large numbers of aircraft over a wide geographic area also provides more ability to surprise an adversary.

SURPRISE

“The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.”  Sun Tzu, The Art of War¹²

In air combat, there are multiple levels of surprise. At the tactical level, surprise may come in the form of losing your front-wave fighters to undetected 5^th generation aircraft. At the operational level, surprise may come from preparing to defend against a limited number of 5^th generation fighters, only to be overwhelmed by stand-off munitions and multiple waves of 4^th generation fighters distracting from an intrusive 5^th generation flank. At the strategic level, surprise may come from expecting a cyber-attack and unexpectedly losing a multitude of space-based capabilities.

As Sun Tzu instructs, “the spot where we intend to fight must not be made known.” The agile employment concept provides a method to increase surprise through operational maneuver. However, the concept must not become rapidly hopping from prepared airbase to prepared airbase. Those locations are known and will be heavily contested by Chinese ballistic missiles. The prepared bases are still critical to logistics, and must be defended fiercely, but to truly leverage agile employment, not only for survivability, but also for surprise, the USAF requires offensive weapon systems capable of utilizing old WW2 strips, highways, defunct airfields, and any other possible launch and recovery area.

Fourth generation fighters play an important role in operational surprise. With increased tolerances to handle heat, sand and moisture, aircraft with unimproved surface capabilities, like the A-10, may be able to “hop” into unobserved and unforeseen locations. Paired with large payloads, operational surprise may be achieved by eight A-10’s employing a mix of 64 Miniature Air Launched Decoys (MALD) and 16 JASSM, on an axis and from a range the adversary thought impossible. Meanwhile, a C-130 dropping DARPA’s Gremlins drones³¹, or Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) Rapid Dragon palletized munitions³², may present another attack axis, and once the enemy responds by reinforcing those lanes with additional fighters, the primary strike package begins ingress along a third axis. The ability to operate from unexpected locations and employ multiple standoff weapons increases the number of ways a commander may achieve operational surprise, and depending on the payload, will increase 5^th generation fighter and stealth bomber survivability and effectiveness. Pairing mixed load-outs amongst large numbers of 4^th generation fighters like the F-15E (or F-15EX, if equipped with conformal fuel tanks) can also induce surprise. If initially tasked to launch waves of JASSM, then rapidly refitted with large numbers of air-to-air missiles, an adversary will struggle to understand what they are defending against when a wave of Strike Eagles or Eagle 2s is maneuvering toward them. Efforts to divest large numbers of platforms capable of utilizing drastically varying weapons to acquire and sustain 5^th generation fighters with less flexibility in their weapons carriage reduces the ability to implement operational surprise.

Stealth is not the only method to achieve surprise in the USAF. In fact, it’s not even a primary way to achieve surprise, as stealth aircraft are not invisible, but rather extremely difficult to shoot down with radar-guided missiles ³³. In Desert Storm, Poobah’s Party demonstrated the utility of saturating enemy airspace, while leveraging the advantages of stealth aircraft.³⁴ A combination of unexpected operating locations, clusters of standoff munitions, decoys, drones, electronic warfare, cyber-attacks, and a well thought out symphony of feints paired with a strong, stealthy left hook provides a clear pathway to true operational surprise for the USAF. To orchestrate such a symphony, the USAF needs a clear pathway toward unity of command in any environment.

UNITY OF COMMAND

“Nothing in war is more important than unity of command. Thus, when war is waged against a single power there must be but one army, acting on one line and led by one chief…Better one bad general than two good ones.” Napoleon Bonaparte, On the Art of War²⁰

“Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War¹²

Napoleon’s keen command and control of his forces demonstrated the power of “one army, acting on one line, led by one chief.” However, the days of running massive command and control (C2) elements from large, semi-hardened structures with full connectivity to all edges of the battlespace are over. Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapon systems paired with anti-satellite missile systems present unique threats to our beyond-line-of-sight communication pathways, as well as our ability to keep airborne command and control aircraft within line-of-sight of frontline fighters and bombers. Agile employment concepts, A2/AD threats, and outdated methods to process, exploit and disseminate information, have led the services to work on Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).²²

According to the Congressional Research Service, “[JADC2] is the DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services… into a single network.” While this concept is long overdue, bringing it to fruition will require the ability to stand up a network spanning from Navy submarines to Army long-range precision fires platforms, to Air Force 5^th Generation fighters and to Space Force assets in various orbits. There’s a significant limitation in creating such a network: all those platforms currently operate datalinks that cannot easily connect to one another. USAF, USN and many Army units use Link-16, Army Fires use Variable Message Format, F-35s use Multifunction Advanced Data Link, F-22s use Intra-Flight Data Link, the Integrated Broadcast Service uses Common Message Format, and other programs are using Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT)²⁶ or the Universal Command and Control Interface. These are just a few of the networks and message formats that would need to be included.

JADC2 must answer the question: how can our force maintain unity of command and implement the “signs and signals” necessary to operate as one coherent force? The USAF and US Space Force have the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). The US Army has Project Convergence. The US Navy has Project Overmatch. Each service has its own command and control requirements, but to synchronize effects in multiple domains, these programs need more open integration. Although some coordination is occurring, much of it is hidden behind security apparatuses that prevent tactical-level operators from informing the developments and design. Without open integration between these programs, we will continue to produce stove pipes of information and decision-making.³⁶ Additionally, these programs intend to provide connectivity in the future, but few acquisitions are targeting the next 3-5 years.

The problem of having incompatible tactical networks that need to be combined is solvable today. Translation hardware and software, like Sierra Nevada Corporation’s Tactical Radio Application eXtension (TRAX)¹⁸, DARPA’s STITCHES²³, and Northrop Grumman’s Freedom 550 radio²⁴, are examples of government and commercial efforts available right now. Unfortunately, there’s a looming issue with any of the currently available translation efforts. They must be installed somewhere with computing power and have access to the networks the users will operate on. Although the F-35 has the most computing power of any US fighter aircraft, the process to implement new software and hardware is extremely expensive, arduous, and requires Lockheed Martin approval, as they are responsible for the software suite. The A-10 and the F-16 are government-owned from tip-to-tail. Full ownership and control present the opportunity to take risks with software and test the limits of open architectures.

Processing power, data translation, communications relay, and incompatible networks are problems 4^th generation aircraft can help solve. With SATCOM already implemented on most 4^th generation aircraft, software upgrades would allow C2 to pass messages over-the-horizon through 4^th generation fighters as a relay to 5^th generation fighters beyond the A2AD line. The sensitive skin of 5^th generation aircraft combined with limited internal space for added transmitters and receivers makes it extremely expensive, if not impossible, to add the required hardware. 4^th generation fighters do not seek stealth, are highly configurable with externally mounted munitions and sensors, and provide a better option for hosting translation software and hardware.

Operating closer to front-line 5^th generation fighters, 4^th generation platforms could carry pods, like Air Force Research Labs’ AgilePod^{TM 25}, to extend the C2 network to the tactical edge. The combination of the Freedom 550 radio, a new antenna, and SNC’s TRAX software running on a modern processor inside something like the AgilePod^TM enables translations between the disparate platforms. This implementation of the AgilePod^TM could connect networks at least 100NM from each 4^th generation fighter carrying the pod.

Additionally, implementation of Open Mission Systems (OMS) designs into 4^th generation aircraft display units, like the F-16’s Center Display Unit (CDU)²⁷, the A-10’s proposed High-Resolution Display System (HRDS)²⁸, or the F-15EX’s wide area display may allow 4^th generation aircraft to help distribute and relay some of the control functions. Increased connectivity back to headquarters locations, increased processing power, and more networking capacity make it easy to imagine 4^th generation aircraft relaying time-sensitive threat warning and targeting messages to 5^th generation aircraft.

Although USAF efforts are heavily focused on connecting F-35s, B-21s, Next-Generation Air Dominance systems, E-7s and space-based assets, these efforts will not come to fruition quickly. 4^th generation fighters provide an excellent, low-cost opportunity to fill the void between the connectivity we have and the connectivity we want.

Achieving unity of command relies on connecting decision-makers to shooters. The additional challenges of building and maintaining those connections during agile combat employment cannot be overstated. However, the necessary software and hardware technologies are available in the commercial market. To realize JADC2 over the next 5-7 years, senior leaders must focus acquisitions on existing technologies which open new data pathways while continuing to merge the services’ individual JADC2 programs. Simultaneously, PACOM, EUCOM and CENTCOM must start the gritty work of mapping data pathways for their critical kill-chains, finding where translations are necessary, identifying where new hardware is necessary, and beginning to leverage aircraft in creative ways. Just as the internet was created one node and connection at a time, the Internet of Military Things (IoMT)²⁹ will require similar, painstaking effort.

CONCLUSION

The debate over which platforms “scare China” does not provide the concrete solutions needed to deter or defeat Chinese aggression in the Pacific. As leaders from around the world observe the fight in Ukraine, it is becoming clear that our best guess about what platforms will provide overmatch³⁵ is just that… a guess. However, the weapons providing success in Ukraine are being employed in an extremely distributed manner, from locations the Russians did not expect, and dispersion is negating much of the technological advantage the Russians enjoy.

It’s time Air Force leaders begin shifting the debate from which platforms are required to get the job done and start discussing how to build an affordable, sustainable force, equipped with the weapons, decoys, drones, and communication pathways that enable mass, maneuver, surprise, and unity of command.

To return to Secretary Kendall’s refrain, the B-52 doesn’t scare China. Five thousand JASSM launched from 80 B-52’s, 200 F-15E’s, 250 A-10’s and 500 F-16’s scares China. Two thousand fighters, launching from 200 locations, carrying 10,000 AMRAAMs scares China. The platforms aren’t scaring China. The dispersion of large numbers of weapons creates the mass that scares China.

The question becomes, how do we build and maintain an affordable force capable of bringing the mass that scares China through rapid, surprising maneuvers while maintaining unity of command?

The USAF must continue investments in new technologies, but with a much sharper eye on sustainment costs. Meanwhile, senior leaders must leverage the capacity, agility, and predictable cost of 4^th generation platforms. Maximize standoff weapon carriage capabilities, increase networking capabilities, and then disperse 4^th generation platforms, with a lot of weapons, to austere and unexpected locations across the battlespace. The dispersion of the weapons and the networking capabilities amongst a plethora of 4^th generation fighters would create the backbone of an air force capable of hitting an adversary hard, from multiple directions, at a time and place of our choosing, while maintaining the ability to rapidly change course. That air force scares China. And it could be the US Air Force by 2025 if we divest our platform-centric mindset and refocus on the principles of war.

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