The Air Force’s A-10 was granted a temporary reprieve in last night’s Senate vote on the NDAA. The language, crafted in the House, survived Harry Reid’s iron fist control over amendments making it to the Senate floor for debate and vote.
While the Air Force is now prevented from taking new action against the A-10, it may continue its actions against the A-10 ANG unit at Fort Smith, Arkansas. According to sources, the 358FS (Fighter Squadron) at Davis Monthan will be deactivated in February and will convert to the 47FS, which will be a reserve unit. The 358FS is an active duty squadron.
The Senate’s vote will slow down the USAF efforts to begin immediate divestment of the A-10. This will prevent both flying hour cuts at Davis Monthan in February 2014, and the massive movement of personnel out of Tucson in summer 2014.
It was Arizona Congressman Ron Barber and New Hampshire Senator Kelly Ayotte who led the fight for the amendment which prevents the Air Force from implementing their plans to fully mothball the A-10.
Sources say the fight to save the A-10 has now really begun and the momentum is on their side.
A Briefing was held on December 5, 2013, which was sponsored by the Straus Military Reform Project and the Project On Government Oversight, was attended “more than 100 people, including congressional staff, journalists, current and recently retired pilots and ground unit commanders, current and former DOD officials and contractors. The event was “prompted by the Air Force’s long pursued plan to retire the A-10 (“Warthog”) close air support aircraft.”
Winslow T. Wheeler, Director of the Straus Military Reform Project argues in an article on the briefing, “If the Air Force succeeds in “divesting” the A-10 fleet, the existing cadre of dedicated, highly skilled CAS experts will be dispersed, leaving only partially trained multi-mission pilots with weak ties to the ground forces: that is to say, pilots who will see CAS as a secondary mission and who will necessarily perform it from inappropriate altitudes and distances, at inappropriate speeds, from inappropriate aircraft. Because of their inherent vulnerability, maneuverability and other limitations, the helicopters in the Army and Marine Corps, the Short Take Off and Vertical Landing jets of the Marines Corps and “fast mover” fighters and bombers of the Air Force cannot replicate the capabilities of the A-10. In particular, the Air Force’s and the Marines’ new multi-role jet, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, cannot match the A-10 on virtually any the primary characteristics of an effective close air support aircraft; for CAS it is a major step backward.
Wheeler notes, the operating characteristics that any aircraft performing close air support must have are:
• A cadre of CAS pilots who thoroughly understand the mission and constantly train it;
• Ability to fly low and slow enough to find targets independently, distinguish real targets from civilians and friendlies, operate in bad weather (below ceilings of 1,000 feet) when the enemy likes to attack and turn around and re-attack in a matter of seconds;
• Three hours of fuel and weapons enabling an extended lethal presence over the battlefield, and the ability to do that up to three times a day;
• Operating off rough airstrips (such as has been the case in Afghanistan and Iraq’s western desert) and living in tents to foster close coordination with the ground force;
• Extreme survivability from armor, triple redundant flight controls, adequate countermeasures and tactics; (for example, against modern Iraqi and Serb air defenses in 1991 and 1999, A-10s proved far more survivable than predicted and at least as survivable as far more costly, so-called “more capable” aircraft, such as the F-117);
• A simple, rugged airframe that can be maintained and repaired quickly;
• A highly effective, precise weapon–usable when the enemy is ten yards from friendlies–such as the GAU-8 gun with enough ammunition for ten to twelve firing passes.
• A diversity of other munitions to compensate for those that may be defeated by countermeasures in future war (GPS guidance) or that may not be useable for extremely close-in attacks (laser guidance);
• Radios (and commensurate training) to communicate effectively with all levels of ground forces;
• High combat capability per dollar to produce a force that can be bought and maintained in large numbers at affordable cost.
To read more about the read more testimony about the A-10 visit http://www.pogo.org/our-work/straus-military-reform-project/military-reform/2013/a-10-warthog-a-core-defense-issue.html
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