Operation Destroy CAS takes a new turn in early March as the United States Air Force, for the first time in memory, opens a summit to discuss Close Air Support. After nearly 14 years of continuous war, where the primary mission of the USAF in Central Command has been CAS, why have a summit now? Is this purely a coincidence, or another method to generate “Big Blue” propaganda points as the annual NDAA markup approaches? It would be nice if the USAF admitted their A-10C divestment analysis is flawed, but it is almost certain they have gone so far, cashed in so much good will, and surrendered so much integrity, that there is simply no turning back from the precipice.
Members of the attack community have several questions on the content and timing of this summit.
• Why would the USAF have a summit with more CAS providers than Ground Force customers? Why would the USAF have more senior ranking careerists in attendance than lower ranking warfighters?
• Why would the Commander of Air Combat Command be meeting with the “capability gap created by A-10 divestment” summit chairman the week prior? Why have a summit at all, given USAF Major General Post’s comments at the 2014 USAF Weapons and Tactics Conference; “Son, don’t worry about it; we will never have boots on the ground again.” If there is not going to be another ground war, why is there a need for such a summit?
The Air Force leadership has developed and nurtured a culture and climate which conveys the clear message that USAF senior leaders know better than the “boots on the ground” what is needed to support close combat and, if anyone disagrees, they are labeled a traitor and face career damaging retaliation. Another interesting fact is the USAF already routinely conducts conferences in which CAS is discussed at the working group (warfighter) level, versus a script reading session by senior officers manipulated by the Chief of Staff.
Our sources believe the reasons for this summit are many:
• First, it will serve as another platform to justify the divestment of the A-10C. The summit will attempt to normalize the masses to the concept that dropping a bomb on coordinates (BOC), regardless of how close friendly forces are, is CAS. This is a fallacy, because the USAF is calling everything CAS to skew their own metrics in favor of airplanes that release deadly weapons without ever looking outside at the target, or ever providing critical analysis to the problem on the ground. The joint doctrine for CAS states “fires in close proximity to ground troops requiring detailed integration” which the USAF is omitting when they categorize deep strike missions as CAS. By calling every mission CAS, they not only justify keeping sacred cows, but they also further the argument for future multi-trillion dollar projects (i.e., long range bomber and 6th generation fighter). As part of the “normalization” process, Joint Close Air Support doctrine was changed recently to justify the use of BOC platforms. This removes all responsibility from limited capability platforms and shifts it to the ONLY person taking fire…the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC).
• Why? This was done in a further attempt to legitimize that virtually anything in the Air Force inventory can do CAS. Another likely agenda item will include the continuing need for the miracle weapon called Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II). The SDB II, a $700 million program in development, is a bomb with wings. This weapon has a complicated tri-mode seeker (coordinate seeking, semi-active laser, IIR/millimeter wave radar) designed to be able to provide a one weapon/one kill capability. This miracle is supposed to be able to strike outside a threat environment day or night, in all weather, during fluid battle situations, in all types of terrain, and never commit fratricide…or so the USAF would have you believe. The first “miracle” they are assuming is accurate target coordinates will always be available. The last 25 years has proven this to be a difficult endeavor under the best of circumstances, let alone the doomsday scenario the USAF insists they are preparing for. Second, this “miracle” is also dependent upon a high level of integration and communication from datalink and global positioning systems that have been exploited and undermined by enemies as simplistic as the Iranians.
• Third, the “miracle” is not employed as quickly as current weapons when released from great distances. It may be able to glide 40 miles, do a loop, and hit moving targets under a thunderstorm, but you had better hope it’s not the one vehicle your Son or Daughter is driving. Fourth, the premise of one weapon/one kill is also flawed due to very limited kill capability the “miracle” has against dynamic CAS targets. And finally, “miracle” weapons have large price tags. Our sources indicate the SDB II (GBU-53/B) unit cost will be in excess of $239,000 for a single bomb. Does anyone really believe we are wealthy enough to expend hundreds of SDB IIs for CAS when the USAF wrings its collective hands and laments that it cannot afford a dedicated CAS platform? The most likely purpose of this summit is to provide the USAF style points to their campaign of total warfare against the A-10 with expected statements such as: “The USAF summit serves as evidence, Senator Ayotte, we do care about CAS. We even asked the warfighters about current and future CAS requirements and the consensus is, we don’t need the A-10C to conduct effective CAS.”
What makes a truly effective CAS community? CAS is about dedicated, highly trained people using tailor made tools to protect friendly forces, and innocent civilians, on the ground while decimating the enemy. Business leaders say that you can tell what kind of company you are by examining your balance sheet. The same can be said of USAF training requirements. Translated, this means those mission areas receiving the majority of training dictates what type of aircraft and community you are. Despite 14 years of continuous Close Air Support warfare, the F-16, F-15E, and B-1 are still required to allocate exponentially more training and resources to missions OTHER than CAS. The stark comparison shows that the A-10C community does at least 32 more CAS sorties than the B-1 (400% increase), 29 more sorties than F-15E (264%), and 28 more sorties than F-16 (233%) annually. In addition, the A-10C is the only aircraft tasked to destroy all target types (including armor) in shockingly close scenarios, day or night, in good and poor weather. These metrics highlight that while the USAF wants to divest its only dedicated CAS platform, they insist on keeping three dedicated sacred cow fleets for the deep strike. I wonder if the U.S. Army will be happy to hear “Don’t worry about being overrun, killed or captured, we are hitting a headquarters building”?
Given the limitations of CAS training already identified, it is helpful to put the comparative lack of experience in context. Pilots accomplishing CAS come in three flavors: Familiar, Proficient and Expert. Familiar means the pilot/crew has seen the mission type before. For example, a familiar pilot has seen enough missions that, if held by the hand, he could follow an expert through a training mission – think a medical school student. Proficient means that the pilot/crew have seen 90% of the likely situations that could arise in the limited training events available – think a medical resident. In contrast, the Expert knows why a situation involving Friendly and Enemy forces in close proximity is confused, has dealt with miscommunication on a daily basis, and can FIX the problems that arise. The CAS Expert can’t wait for someone else to fix the problem, because seconds are hours when Ground Troops are under fire – think Cardiac Specialist. The training metrics discussed earlier illustrate a clear distinction between those who “dabble” in CAS and those who live it. When put in context of possible CAS scenarios, of which there are at least 40 possible, you have to ask yourself “is a medical school student good enough to treat a heart attack”? What kind of a specialist do you want protecting your Son or Daughter on the ground when the bullets are flying?
Elements within the USAF sacred cow communities believe they can overcome a lack of credibility if they just emphasize more training and establish “customer relationships.” Training is important, but it has to be the right type of training. In order to be credible and gain the trust of other CAS team members, a habitual training program must be implemented. This program must go way beyond “everyone gets a ribbon” type training being conducted by the herd of dabblers now. This training must be tailored to learn and apply ground unit scheme of maneuver, friendly formations and identification, communications, danger close operations, and integration of other battlefield weapons in order to gain TRUE capability. This requires the “herd” to conduct detailed mission planning, participate in Army “rock” drills, train to the toughest mission sets (night, adverse weather, very close to friendlies, dynamic targets, integration of fires etc.), execute comprehensive briefing and debriefing, and fully applying lessons learned with repetition to the point of near automatic “muscle memory”. This type of training regime takes true dedication, all-encompassing training emphasis, and absolute dedication from the top down. In effect what this is asking for is a COMPLETE paradigm shift for the USAF into a close air SUPPORT mindset. Lastly, when it comes time for deployment, true CAS assets search out the ground force customer’s tactical operations centers and locate as close to them as possible. The detailed mission integration and relationships must continue in the deployed environment in order to ensure the fluid battlefield dynamics are understood, captured, and tactics are adapted accordingly. It is only through these efforts that CAS platforms will realize what full integration with our Ground Troops truly is: that the REAL fight is on the ground; how they can affect the battle; and how they must build relationships with the end customer. Although this approach will help on the training and relationship fronts, the deep strike aircraft design flaws cannot be overcome by simply putting a new brand on the herd.
The ugly truth is that CAS aircraft are a tool – training and relationships cannot make up for a lack of basic capability. Deep strike aircraft were designed with specific tasks in mind, and many of these are contrary to the mission of CAS. The sacred cows are characterized by high speed, low radar cross section, precision free-fall ordnance, very little forward firing air-to-ground weapons, and, if they have a gun, it was designed for air-to-air fighting with limited bullets and limited accuracy for air-to-ground employment. For survivability, most have a very limited number of countermeasures, vulnerable fly by wire controls, limited aircraft survivability if hit, no specific crew protection, and fuel wrapped around turbojet engines. Why? These particular cows were meant to fight (air-to-air) their way in deep, strike fixed targets quickly and accurately, and then fight their way out. While these design characteristics are highly sought after for deep strike, they simply are not appropriate for the CAS environment. So how are the design characteristics of a CAS aircraft different and why? CAS requires an aircraft which provides continuous presence, pressure, literally tons of firepower, and the ability to take considerable damage and still fight.
With these required design characteristics in mind, let’s examine the A-10C:
• Austere field and forward area arming and refueling point operations – allows aircraft to get back in the fight quickly landing on the same dirt strips or dry lake beds as the customer, for refueling and rearming. Do not try this with an F-15E or an F-16!
• Persistence – high bypass engines provide long on-station times. A CAS asset cannot maintain presence without being able to loiter over a battle area for an extended length of time.
• Relatively slow, but maneuverable – Ability to conduct BOTH a sensor AND a visual fight thus quickly discerning friendly locations from enemy forces. This also provides the ability to fly in narrow valleys while under bad weather, day or night.
• Re-attack quickly to keep continuous pressure on the enemy through maneuverability and staying close to the target. Specific wing design allows the A-10C to have a very small turn radius even at slow speeds.
• Forward firing ordnance with overwhelming killing capability against all target sets, (static or moving) light or armored. The A-10C GAU-8/A “Avenger” 30mm gun is five times more powerful and possesses more than double the quantity of bullets than any other cannon possessed by the herd. Further, the tailored aircraft/gun design of the A-10 is optimized for air-to-ground employment.
• Self-Protection systems and countermeasures of a quantity and type to maintain continuous presence in the contested area. A-10C designers applied the lessons learned from Korea and Vietnam and created the most survivable aircraft ever built . . . period. Mechanical redundancy, fuel and engine separation, two engines, high bypass engines to reduce heat signature and increase time on station, ability to disconnect damaged flight controls, and superior pilot protection are all attributes only found on the A-10C. The A-10C carries six to eight times the number of expendable countermeasures and is the only fighter in the inventory with an infrared and laser missile warning system.
Wouldn’t it be great if we had a platform that had it all? Dedicated training, established relationships, and a platform with design characteristics specially tailored for CAS? For the same reason you don’t take a Formula One race car to a Monster Truck event, you cannot take a B-1 to a troops-in-contact event and expect a consistent result. These attributes cannot be trained, they must be designed, perfected, and continuously evolved. These design characteristics have shown time and time again they definitively affect the battle and save lives. There was no bigger skeptic of the A-10 than Gen (Ret) Chuck Horner. But after just a few days of Desert Storm he posted this note to all Airmen in the air tasking order spins: “I take back all the bad things I ever said about the A-10, they are saving our asses”.
Most sources feel this upcoming Summit will be a sham; yet another attempt by USAF leadership to peddle the hollow narrative “the A-10C is no longer required”. Like Snake Oil salesmen of one hundred years ago, today’s Air Force leadership has embraced an opportunity to rid itself of a platform and a mission that it no longer desires by selling a narrative that is, to be polite, a shameless, bold-faced lie. Only now, they hope to have the credibility of a “CAS Summit” report weighing in their favor. Clearly the USAF leadership either “doesn’t know what it doesn’t know” or simply doesn’t care. A lack of close coordination with their Ground Force customers have lead them down the path of “I’m ok, you’re ok”. They fail to “connect the dots” and fully understand how the training, relationships, and A-10C design characteristics have combined to provide our Ground Troops with world-class SUPPORT. Thankfully, through the intervention of Combatant Commanders both in Europe and the Middle East, a token number of TRUE CAS assets have been deployed to ensure angels guard the backs of our Sons and Daughters while they face evil once again.
See related articles:
USAF desperation behind A-10 friendly fire death message
A-10 pilot recognized for heroism, awarded Distinguished Flying Cross with Valor
Senator calls for investigation of Post’s treason comments
Post’s Comments Generate Calls for Congressional Hearing
Post’s comments send chill through Air Force ranks, A-10 panics ISIS
JTAC on A 10: “the sound of don’t mess with me”