“They follow the principle that when one lies, it should be a big lie, and one should stick to it. They keep up their lies, even at the risk of looking ridiculous.” ~ Joseph Goebbels, Third Reich Minister of Propaganda
An article in USA Today regarding the United States Air Force’s A-10 and friendly fire incidents has caused a fire storm across the military community. The article, A-10 warplane tops list for friendly fire deaths, by Tom Vanden Brook, appears to many to be a desperate attempt by the USAF to discredit the craft just as it is being hailed by enemies of ISIL.
Tony Carr, who won the Distinguished Flying Cross and writes in the popular military blog, John Q. Public, describes the article as a “lamentable piece of journalism, with Vanden Brook perhaps unwittingly advancing a despicable bundle of lies on behalf of the unnamed officials who made him their message mule.”
Senator Kelly Ayotte, a staunch advocate for the A-10, issued a statement in response to the piece: “Every death of an American or allied service member or an innocent civilian is a heart-breaking tragedy. No aircraft that conducts close air support missions — which by definition involve the close proximity of friendly and enemy forces — is immune from fratricide. But as our ground troops and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers will tell you, the unique CAS capabilities of the A-10 have saved hundreds of American lives.”
“Unfortunately, the Air Force is again making selective use of data to support its misguided, dangerous, and premature divestment of the A-10—a divestment that ignores the advice of the overwhelming majority of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) who know close air support best,” concluded Ayotte.
Vanden Brook claims his work is based on “data declassified and obtained by USA TODAY.” Sources familiar with the data, upon which Vanden Brook based his work, allege that the author either misunderstood, or deliberately misrepresented the data. Either way, as Carr concludes, Vanden Brook’s claims are “fundamentally misleading.”
It is important to understand that few deaths are as painful to the military community, as those caused by friendly fire. In the Attack community, protecting friendly troops, allies, and civilians is considered a personal and professional responsibility. Protecting their “brothers and sisters on the ground” is embedded deeply within the culture.
From pilot training, to the aircraft modernization efforts, the A-10 is designed to provide the sort of Close Air Support that minimizes friendly fire incidents. As a result, Vanden Brook’s claims come not only as a surprise to the Attack community, but exposed the Air Force’s propaganda for what it is: a big lie which is making the Air Force look ridiculous.
While the USAF might look ridiculous, no one is laughing. There is nothing funny about the USAF’s desperation to ditch its responsibility to the troops. As Carr notes, “This is about ridding itself of a Close Air Support (CAS) mission it doesn’t want — a function it doesn’t consider to be part of its core duty to national defense. The campaign to retire the A-10 has been ongoing for two decades, and misrepresenting its contribution to national defense has been part and parcel of that campaign.”
The CAS mission is essential although hard to define. CAS is not what the Air Force says it is – it is what the ground commander decides it is. The JTACs will tell you that CAS is whatever the troops need it to be at any given moment.
The battlefield, as assessed by the ground commander, defines CAS. CAS can be as mundane as taking out a building or more likely than not, the “hell on earth moments” when a pilot must kill the enemy in close proximity to friendlies.
In those instance, not only is the pilot operating the craft, they are providing the sanity check. Above the battle, they know that the guys on the ground are dodging bullets. They see what the troops and JTACs cannot. Their vantage point provides a three dimensional view of the chaos created by the fog of war.
Joint publications can explain how CAS is conducted, but they cannot explain the pressures on JTACs as they sort out what needs to be done, and where – exactly – it needs to be done. The current class of USAF generals have never been put through the baptism by fire that JTAC’s experience every time they pronounce the coordinates for CAS action.
That action is a team effort. No one person is responsible for its success or failure. No one person or aircraft is responsible for the deaths that will result from the action. Together, the JTACs, pilots, and troops live that “hell on earth moment.”
Perhaps it is the fact that A-10 pilots serve the needs of the troops, and not the generals that makes them vulnerable. There are other communities in the Air Force that do only what they want to do – and it is not CAS. They will do it if they have to; A-10 pilots do it because they want to. Why else would an otherwise bright person volunteer to climb into a bathtub with a Gatling gun strapped to it and fly into the middle of the fight and stay there until the enemy is annihilated and our troops are safe.”
CAS is not sexy and it isn’t fun. Just ask General Post. Post, now infamous for his treason comments, told a large group of officers last year, “I can’t wait to be done with the burden of Close Air “Support.” For the A-10 pilots, CAS is hardly a burden. They are in the service to be of service not to Lockheed Martin, but to the men and woman on the ground from loving families, who await the safe return of their loved ones – not a return on some investment.
Post’s comments reflect the USAF culture. A culture in which the things they enjoy doing drive the ways they spend their money. The brass does not want to spend money in support of other services. They spend money on the war they want; air-to-air, and not the wars we have; up close and personal.
An aircraft does not exist that fights as up close and personal as the A-10. As a result, Vanden Brook’s claims are absurd on their face to anyone familiar with CAS.
The A-10’s GAU-8/A Avenger 30mm gun’s attack minimum safe distance for ground troops in defensive prone positions is 65 yards. There have been numerous instances of “danger close” events that have required employment as close as 15 yards.
The A-10’s gun is the most accurate, and powerful gun in any DoD fighter. With a built-in stabilization device say “the aircraft aiming point remains on the target during the gun burst.” No other plane has that capability.
Despite Vanden Brook’s claims, not one instance of fratricide has occurred by the A-10C. Not one. The A-10C has been in action since 2007 No fratricide has occurred as the result of A-10C action thanks to its ability to confirm target/friendly locations using High Definition sensors, displays, Helmet Mounted Cueing System, and datalink suites.
Other planes are prevented from performing the closest of CAS. For the most part, if another craft is inside of 200 yards from its target, it cannot without additional coordination from the Ground Commander due to the extremely high risk to our troops. Other planes lack adequate displays and sensors, as well. Not only do other planes lack the firepower, and accuracy, they lose bullets. The A-10’s unique 30mm system does not skip over unused bullets, instead it returns to them. Other platforms without this feature can lose up to 20 percent of their bullets in a battle.
The metrics Vanden Brook’s relies on are deceptive. In fact, the most comprehensive analysis of data available to the USAF according to sources shows that the A-10 has the lowest Civilian Casualties rate of all DoD fighters and bombers at a rate of 1.4 per 100 weapons employment events as compared to the B-1 at 6.5 and the AV-8B at 8.3.
That bears repeating: the A-10 has the lowest Civilian Casualties rate of all DoD fighters and bombers at a rate of 1.4 per 100 weapons employment events as compared to the B-1 at 6.5 and the AV-8B at 8.3.
One must put fratricide in the proper context:
Independent analysis of employment in Afghanistan since 2001 reveals A-10s have done over 40 percent of all the weapons employment, otherwise known as attacks. The A-10s do this despite the fact that they only comprise 5 percent of the deployed fleet.
The USAF conveniently ignores data from 2001 going forward in order to make the claim that the A-10 has done about 29 percent (still the highest of all fixed wing aircraft) of the kinetic events.
The Air Force focuses only on data from 2009 going forward in order to manipulate the masses and the writers who are read their work.
Experts agree that the actual numbers would show that the number of fratricides per A-10 attack would be far lower than those of other craft. They would have to be, due to the sheer nature of their capability. Bombers can only make one pass, A-10s make multiple passes over a battle.
Because the USAF has deliberately hindered the A-10, the airplane has only performed 14 percent of missions against ISIL. The A-10s did not deploy from Afghanistan to Kuwait until November of 2014, while other assets were sent in August. The Air Force, due in part to buffoonery also delayed the arrival of critical parts. Even so, the A-10 unit cancelled no missions due the delay until two months into combat. Experts say this proves the reliability of the platform and the USAF’s commitment to being “stuck on stupid.”
It is clear to many in the military community that Vanden Brook’s piece is a product of the USAF. Gannet owns USA Today and the Military Times, and Vanden Brook’ use of Brig. Gen. Patrick Malackowski as a source exposes the insidious nature of the USAF propaganda campaign. Malackowski , although a former A-10 pilot and commander, did not speak for the Attack community when he told Vanden Brook, “If time is an issue and you need to get there quickly, then the A-10 is not the preferred platform.”
If the A-10 is not the preferred platform, then what is the preferred platform for up-close-and-personal CAS support? It doesn’t matter how quickly one gets to the job site, if when they arrive they can’t do the work.
The latest USAF tactic of inserting careerist generals, who have A-10 experience, might work for Vanden Brook, but Vanden Brook must at least follow up with the question of what happens if the USAF is allowed to deploy insufficient assets to provide the COCOM with continual CAS presence?
The general’s statement that the “best aircraft for a mission depends on the threat.” Shows how little he understands what the Attack community knows: the best aircraft for a CAS mission is the one that can destroy the enemy regardless of the ground situation.
Malackowski’s statement reflects the attitude by many in the USAF that ground troops are expendable and pilots are not. To be sure it is his job to protect his pilots, but he cannot ignore the fact that it is their job to protect the troops.
It is that job that makes Vanden Brook’s hit piece so disturbing to so many. Vanden Brook not only relied on limited “facts” and figures, he failed to understand that the A-10 is not simply an aircraft; it is the embodiment of a mission. That mission involves JTACs, ground troops, and servant pilots.
One better have their facts straight before they even begin a discussion of fratricide. Great care is taken to avoid it, and equal care must be given to a discussion of it.
See related articles:
A-10 pilot recognized for heroism, awarded Distinguished Flying Cross with Valor
Senator calls for investigation of Post’s treason comments
Post’s Comments Generate Calls for Congressional Hearing
Post’s comments send chill through Air Force ranks, A-10 panics ISIS
JTAC on A 10: “the sound of don’t mess with me”
A-10 in play as Senate Appropriations Committee drafts FY 2015 NDAA
Ayotte: If the Air Force cut their acquisition failures they could save the A-10
Air Force brass taken to task for A-10 mothball plans